Luzon

Luzon

Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in
the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates
us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge.
While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military schol-
ars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans
has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and mil-
itary implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a
people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not
only about the profession of arms, but also about military prepared-
ness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war
against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will
participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World
War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various
materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works pro-
duced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew
pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been
called “the mighty endeavor.”

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several
diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following
essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles
that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are
designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s significant military feats
from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military
History by Dale Andrade. I hope this absorbing account of that period
will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during
World War II.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

LUZON

15 December 1944-4 July 1945

"The Philippine theater of operations is the locus of victory or
defeat," argued General Douglas M acArthur, as Japanese planes strafed
and bombed key installations around Manila on 8 December 1941.
Although overwhelming Japanese strength ultimately forced the United
States to relinquish the Philippines, M acArthur began planning his
return almost immediately from bases in Australia. Throughout the
long campaign to push the Japanese out of their Pacific bastions, these
islands remained his crucial objective. "The President of the United
States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines.. .for the purpose,
as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan,
a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines," M acArthur
said when he took over as Allied commander in the Southwest Pacific.
"I came through and I shall return." As the Pacific campaign dragged
on, M acArthur never strayed far from that goal, and every move he
made was aimed ultimately at recapturing the lost archipelago.

Strategic Setting

In March 1942 a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive established two
U.S. military commands in the Pacific: the Southwest Pacific Area,
headed by General M acArthur, and the Pacific Ocean Areas, under
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The decision clearly violated the principle
of unity of command. However, with naval officers objecting to
M acArthur, the senior officer in the region, as overall Pacific comman-
der and with M acArthur unlikely to subordinate himself to another, the
ensuing division of authority seemed a workable compromise. Given
the size of the theater and the different national contingents involved,
it may even have been a blessing. But it left no single authority in the
Pacific to decide between conflicting plans or to coordinate between
the two. Even M acArthur later wrote that "of all the faulty decisions
of the war, perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify
the command in the Pacific, [which], ..resulted in divided effort; the
waste, diffusion, and duplication of force; and the consequent exten-
sion of the war with added casualties and cost."

From a strategic perspective, this divided command had a direct
impact on decisions leading up to the invasion of the Philippines.

3

During the spring of 1944, the J oint Chiefs debated the merits of seiz-
ing Luzon or the Chinese island of Formosa as an initial point for
direct operations against J apan. Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of
Naval Operations, had long objected to landings in the Philippines,
and by May 1944 he was joined by Army Chief of Staff General
George C. M arshall and Army Air Force Chief of Staff General H enry
H. Arnold. M arshall felt that M acArthur's Luzon plan would be "the
slow way” and that it made more sense to "cut across" from the
Mariana Islands to Formosa. MacArthur, on the other hand, argued
that the Formosa route was militarily "unsound" and that the
Philippine Islands provided a more sensible staging area for the final
assault against the J apanese home islands. As commander of the
Philippine defenses in 1941, MacArthur felt a strong moral responsi-
bility to free the entire archipelago of the brutal Japanese occupation.
Making the Philippines a major Pacific objective gave his Southwest
Pacific command a key mission.

By July 1944 most planners agreed that an invasion of Formosa
was not logistical ly feasible in the near future. In September thejoint
Chiefs thus approved a December starting date for M acArthur's inva-
sion of Leyte Island in the central Philippines. The invasion would be
followed by an assault on either Luzon, the large, northernmost
Philippine island, on 20 February or Formosa on 1 M arch. But it was
not until October that Admiral King finally agreed that Luzon was the
better choice.

From the Japanese perspective, control of the islands was vital.
Loss of the Philippines would threaten J apan's overseas access to food-
stuffs and critical raw materials, especially oil, from the East Indies
and Southeast Asia. Thus, Tokyo's naval and army leaders vowed to
make the defense of the Philippines their major war effort for
1943-44. For these purposes the commander of Japanese land forces
in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the former conqueror
of British Malaya and Singapore, had some 430,000 troops stationed
all across the islands, while J apanese naval leaders were prepared to
commit the entire battle fleet. If the A mericans could be stopped here,
then perhaps the entire tide of the war could be changed or, at least,
J apan's position greatly strengthened.

M acArthur's return to the Philippines began on the island of Leyte
in October 1944. Prior to the amphibious assault, the Japanese carrier
force had been decimated in the battle of the Philippine Sea on 19-20
J une of the same year. M oreover, the battle of Leyte Gulf in October saw
most of the J apanese surface fleet destroyed with little to show for its
sacrifice. Japan's once formidable air force was also decimated, leaving

4

the skies over the Philippines open to American air power. Yet the pri-
mary objective of assaulting Leyte was to provide a staging area for a
much larger effort, the assault against the island of Luzon where most of
the Japanese land defenses lay. The operations on Leyte in December
gave the A mericans little more than a foothold in the Philippines.

Operations

Before Luzon could be attacked, M acArthur needed a base of oper-
ations closer to his objective than Leyte. He picked M indoro, an island
with minimal Japanese defenses just south of Luzon. About half the
size of New J ersey, M indoro is blanketed by mountains, with a few nar-
row plains along the coast. The high peaks trap clouds moving up from
the south, causing almost daily rains and high humidity and making the
island a breeding ground for malaria and other tropical diseases.

From MacArthur's point of view Mindoro was important only for
its potential airfields, could supplement the unsatisfactory ones
recently constructed on Leyte. Landing areas in the northeastern part
of the island were best, but constant inclement weather and the air-
fields' proximity to what was left of Japanese air power on Luzon
ruled them out. Instead, planners chose to secure beachhead and air-
field sites near San Jose, in the southwest corner of the island.
A Ithough not ideal, the region lay near M angarin Bay, M indoro's best
anchorage. This location would provide a base for the amphibious
invasion fleet and allow land-based American aircraft to intensify their
attacks against the J apanese on L uzon.

M acArthur assigned the seizure of M indoro to Lt. Gen. Walter
Krueger's Sixth Army. Krueger, in turn, gave the task to Maj. Gen.
Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, who
was to employ one organic regiment, the 19th Infantry, and the sepa-
rate 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team. Although the airborne
unit was originally scheduled to jump into the battle area, the limited
capacity of the Leyte airfields dictated that they arrive by sea, along-
side the infantry. In any case, naval support for the small landing was
substantial, with 6 escort carriers, 3 battleships, 6 cruisers, and many
small warships providing direct support.

For the amphibious assault vessels and supporting warships, the
main threat came from Japanese land-based kamikaze suicide planes.
T he J apanese had begun the practice as a desperate measure during the
final stages of the Leyte Campaign, perfecting it during December. On
the 13th, two days before the scheduled assault on M indoro, the light

5

U ,S, troops land and prepare for attack. (N ational A rchives)

cruiser Nashville was hit by a kamikaze, killing over 130 men and
wounding another 190. Among the injured was Brig. Gen. William C.
Dunkel, commander of the landing force. Later kamikaze attacks dam-
aged two landing ships, tank (LSTs) and disabled several other ships.
U.S. Army and Navy aviation did what they could during the first
weeks of December. The Army claimed to have destroyed about 450
Japanese planes in the air and on the ground throughout the
Philippines and the Navy 270 more.

The invasion of M indoro began on 15 December. Clear weather
allowed full use of U.S. air and naval power against virtually no
Japanese resistance. The ensuing landings were also unopposed. With
only about 1,000 Japanese troops on the large island, plus some 200
survivors from ships sunk off M indoro while on their way to Leyte,
the defenders could do little. By the end of the first day, Army engi-
neers were hard at work preparing airfields for the invasion of Luzon.
The first was completed in five days; a second was ready in thirteen.
Together the airfields allowed American aircraft to provide more direct

6

support for the planned Luzon beachhead, striking kamikaze airfields
before aircraft could take off and harrying Japanese shipping between
L uzon, Formosa, and southern J apan.

From his headquarters in M ani la, General Yamashita realized that
he could expect little outside support. Thejapanese naval and air arms
had done their best in the preceding months but to no avail, and they
had been largely destroyed in the process. Moreover, Yamashita's
forces on Luzon, some 260,000 strong, were weak in artillery, trans-
port, armor, and other modern equipment. They would be unable to
face the well-equipped American Army units in open warfare. Thus
Yamashita decided to fight a delaying action, keeping his army in the
field as long as possible. During his 1941-42 defense of the
Philippines, MacArthur had considered Manila, the central Luzon
plains, and the Bataan Peninsula critical, with their harbors and air-
fields. TheJ apanese commander, however, had no intention of defend-
ing these sites. Instead, Yamashita planned to withdraw the bulk of his
forces into three widely separated mountain strongholds and settle
down for a long battle of attrition.

Long before the American invasion began, General Yamashita
divided his Luzon forces into three groups, each centered around a
remote geographical region. The largest of these groups and under the
direct command of Yamashita was Shobu Group, located in northern
Luzon with about 152,000 troops. A much smaller force, Kembu
Group, with approximately 30,000 troops, occupied the Clark Air
Field complex as well as the Bataan Peninsula and Corridor. The third
major force, Shimbu Group, consisted of some 80,000 soldiers occu-
pying the southern sections of Luzon, an area that included the island's
long Bicol Peninsula as well as the mountains immediately east of
Manila. Most Shimbu units were in the latter area and controlled the
vital reservoirs that provided most of the capital area's water supply.

On the A merican side, General M acArthur intended to strike first at
Lingayen Gulf, an area of sheltered beaches on the northwestern coast
of Luzon. A landing there would place his troops close to the best roads
and railways on the island, all of which ran through the central plains
south to Manila, his main objective. Also, by landing that far north of
the capital, M acArthur allowed himself maneuvering room for the large
force he intended to use on Luzon. But once the beachhead was secure,
his initial effort would focus on a southern drive to the Filipino capital.
Possession of this central core, as well as M anila Bay, would allow his
forces to dominate the island and make a further coordinated defense by
thej apanese exceedingly difficult. U Itimately ten U.S. divisions and five
independent regiments would see action on Luzon, making it the largest

7

campaign of the Pacific war and involving more troops than the U nited
States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.

The weather on 9 January (called S-day) was ideal. A light over-
cast dappled the predawn sky, and gentle waves promised a smooth
ride onto the beach. At 0700 the preassault bombardment began and
was followed an hour later by the landings. With little initial Japanese
opposition, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed almost 175,000 men
along a twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. While the I Corps,
commanded by Lt. Gen. Innis P. Swift, protected the beachhead's
flanks, Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps prepared to drive
south, first to Clark Field and then to Manila. Only after the Manila
area had been secured was Swift's I Corps to push north and east to
seize the vital road junctions leading from the coast into the mountains
of northern Luzon.

Almost from the beginning there was friction between MacArthur
and some of his subordinates. Krueger wanted the I Corps to secure
the roads leading east into the mountains before the XIV Corps
advanced south. Already, he pointed out, I Corps had encountered
opposition on the beachhead's northern, or left, flank, while the XIV
Corps had found little resistance to the south. Cautious, Krueger hesi-
tated before committing his army to a narrow thrust directly toward
M anila with his eastern flank open to a possible Japanese attack.

M acArthur disagreed. Fie thought it unlikely that the Japanese
were capable of mounting an attack in Sixth Army's rear or flank and
directed Krueger to follow his prearranged plans, seizing Clark Air
Field and the port facilities at Manila as soon as possible. So on 18
January Griswold's XIV Corps moved south with the 37th and 40th
Infantry Divisions, leaving Sixth Army's eastern flank undefended as
it proceeded from the beachhead area. But with Yamashita's Shobu
Group relatively inactive, Krueger's concerns proved unwarranted. As
at the beachhead, the Japanese put up little opposition to the drive
south, having evacuated the central plains earlier. Only when
Griswold's troops reached the outskirts of Clark Field on 23 January
did they run up against determined resistance, and it came from the
relatively weak Kembu Group. For more than a week the Japanese
fought a stubborn battle against the advancing Americans, and it was
not until the end of January that the airfield was in American hands.
Leaving the 40th Division behind to occupy the area, Krueger
regrouped the XIV Corps and on 2 February continued south toward
the capital.

From the beginning, MacArthur remained unhappy with the pace
of the advance. He personally drove up and down the advancing line,

9

inspecting units and making suggestions. On 30 January, after visiting
the 37th Division as it advanced south from San Fernando toward
Calumpit, MacArthur sent off a message to Krueger criticizing "the
noticeable lack of drive and aggressive initiative." Later, while visit-
ing the 1st Cavalry Division, which had just arrived in Luzon to rein-
force the XIV Corps, he told the division commander, M aj. Gen.
Verne D. M udge, to "Go to M ani la, go around the Nips, bounce off the
Nips, but go to Manila." In response, M udge formed a mechanized
task force under the 1st Cavalry Brigade commander, Brig. Gen.
William C. Chase, commanding two motorized cavalry squadrons
reinforced with armor and motorized artillery and support units. This
"flying column" rushed toward Manila while the rest of the division
followed and mopped up.

At the same time MacArthur added additional forces to the drive
on the capital. On 15 January he launched Operation M ike vi, a second
amphibious assault some forty-five miles southwest of M anila. On 31
January, X-ray Day, two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division, under
the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, landed unopposed. The
paratroopers seized a nearby bridge before the surprised Japanese
defenders had a chance to demolish it, and then the paratroopers turned
toward Manila. The division's third regiment, the 511th Parachute,
dropped in by air to join the advance, which by the following day was
speeding north along the paved highway toward the capital to the
cheers of throngs of grateful Filipino civilians along the way.

Originally the 11th Airborne Division, one of Lt. Gen. Robert L.
Eichelberger's Eighth Army units, had been slated to contain Japanese
troops throughout southwestern Luzon. But acting on MacArthur's
orders, Eichelberger pushed the division north. On 3 February one bat-
talion of the 511th encountered determined J apanese resistance near the
town of Imus, five miles south of M anila, where some fifty defenders
clung to an old stone building despite a fierce bombardment by the bat-
talion's 75-mm. howitzers. Observing that the artillery had had little
effect, T. Sgt. RobertC. Steel climbed onto the building's roof, knocked
a hole through it, poured in gasoline, and then threw in a phosphorous
grenade. As the Japanese dashed out, Steel's men shot them down.

Another three miles up the road lay the Las Pinas River bridge. It
was set for demolition and guarded by a small detachment of Japanese
who were dug in along the north bank. Despite the fierce firelight less
than an hour before at I mus, the J apanese were surprised by the appear-
ance of the Americans. The paratroopers secured the span before it
could be blown. With one battalion guarding the bridge, another passed
over on trucks toward M anila, hoping to enter the city from the south.

11

It was not to be. By dawn on 4 February the paratroopers ran into
increasingly heavy and harassing fire from Japanese riflemen and
machine gunners. At the Paranaque River, just south of the M anila city
limits, the battalion halted at a badly damaged bridge only to be bat-
tered by Japanese artillery fire from Nichols Field. The 11th Airborne
Division had reached the main Japanese defenses south of the capital
and could go no further.

The "race" for M anila was now between the 37th Division and the
1st Cavalry Division, with the cavalry in the lead. Since the operation
had begun in late January, its units had been fortunate enough to find
bridges and fordable crossings almost everywhere they went. On 2
February Chase's flying column was dashing toward M anila, sometimes
at speeds of fifty miles per hour, with individual units competing for the
honor of reaching the city first. The 37th Division, on the other hand,
was slowed down by difficult crossings which forced it to either ferry its
artillery and tanks across or wait for the engineers to build bridges.

On 3 February elements of the 1st Cavalry Division pushed into
the northern outskirts of Manila, with only the steep-sided Tuliahan
River separating them from the city proper. A squadron of the 8th
Cavalry reached the bridge just moments after J apanese soldiers had
finished preparing it for demolition. As the two sides opened fire on
one another, the Japanese lit the fuse leading to the carefully placed
explosives. Without hesitation, Lt. James P. Sutton, a Navy demoli-
tions expert attached to the division, dashed through the enemy fire
and cut the burning fuse. The way to M anila was clear.

That evening, the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs
and into the city itself. The troopers had won the race to M anila. As
the sun set over the ocean behind the advancing Americans, a single
tank named "Battling Basic" crashed through the walls surrounding
Santo Tomas University, the site of a camp holding almost 4,000 civil-
ian prisoners. The Japanese guards put up little resistance, and soon
the inmates, many of whom had been incarcerated for nearly two
years, were liberated.

Despite the initial American euphoria, much fighting remained.
Although the approach to the city had been relatively easy, wresting
the capital from the Japanese proved far more difficult. Manila, a
city of 800,000, was one of the largest in Southeast Asia. While
much of it consisted of ramshackle huts, the downtown section
boasted massive reinforced concrete buildings built to withstand
earthquakes and old Spanish stone fortresses of equal size and
strength. Most were located south of the Pasig River which bisects
the capital, requiring that the Americans cross over before closing

12

Sniper fire keeps infantrymen low as medium tanks advance.
(National Archives)

with the enemy. Even a half-hearted defense was bound to make
M anila's recapture difficult.

Regarding Manila as indefensible, General Yamashita had origi-
nally ordered the commander of Shimbu Group, General Yokoyama
Shizuo, to destroy all bridges and other vital installations and evacu-
ate the city as soon as strong American forces made their appear-
ance. However, Rear A dm. Iwabachi Sanji, the naval commander for
the Manila area, vowed to resist the Americans and countermanded
the order. Determined to support the admiral as best he could,
Yokoyama contributed three Army battalions to Iwabachi's 16,000-
man M anila Naval Defense Force and prepared for battle. The sailors
knew little about infantry tactics or street fighting, but they were
well armed and entrenched throughout the capital. Iwabachi resolved
to fight to the last man.

On 4 February 1945, General M acArthur announced the imminent
recapture of the capital while his staff planned a victory parade. But
the battle for M anila had barely begun. Almost at once the 1st Cavalry
Division in the north and the 11th Airborne Division in the south
reported stiffening Japanese resistance to further advances into the
city. As one airborne company commander remarked in mock serious-
ness, "Tell Halsey to stop looking for the Jap Fleet; it's dying on
N ichols Field." All thoughts of a parade had to be put aside.

Following the initial American breakthrough on the fourth, fight-
ing raged throughout the city for almost a month. The battle quickly
came down to a series of bitter street-to-street and house-to-house
struggles. In an attempt to protect the city and its civilians, M acArthur
placed stringent restrictions on U.S. artillery and air support. But mas-
sive devastation to the urban area could not be avoided. In the north,
General Griswold continued to push elements of the XIV Corps south
from Santo Tomas University toward the Pasig River. Late on the
afternoon of 4 February he ordered the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, to
seize Quezon Bridge, the only crossing over the Pasig that the
Japanese had not destroyed. As the squadron approached the bridge,
enemy heavy machine guns opened up from a formidable roadblock
thrown up across Quezon Boulevard. The Japanese had pounded steel
stakes into the pavement, sown the area with mines, and lined up old
truck bodies across the road. Unable to advance farther, the cavalry
withdrew after nightfall. As the Americans pulled back, the Japanese
blew up the bridge.

The next day, 5 February, went more smoothly. Once the 37th
Division began to move into Manila, Griswold divided the northern
section of the city into two sectors, with the 37th responsible for the

14

western half and the 1st Cavalry responsible for the eastern part. By
the afternoon of the 8th, 37th Division units had cleared most
Japanese from their sector, although the damage done to the residen-
tial districts was extensive. The Japanese added to the destruction by
demolishing buildings and military installations as they withdrew.
But the division's costliest fighting occurred on Provisor Island, a
small industrial center on the Pasig River. The Japanese garrison,
probably less than a battalion, held off elements of the division until
11 February.

The 1st Cavalry Division had an easier time, encountering little
opposition in the suburbs east of Manila. Although the 7th and 8th
Cavalry fought pitched battles near two water supply installations
north of the city, by 10 February the cavalry had extended its control
south of the river. That night, the XIV Corps established for the first
time separate bridgeheads on both banks of the Pasig River.

The final attack on the outer Japanese defenses came from the
11th Airborne Division, under the XIV Corps control since 10
February. The division had been halted at N ichols Field on the fourth
and since then had been battling firmly entrenched Japanese naval

15

G eneral M acArthur and members of his staff at a ceremony of
the American flag being raised once again on the island of
Corregidor. (National Archives)

* \

troops, backed up by heavy fire from concealed artillery. Only on 11
February did the airfield finally fall to the paratroopers, but the acqui-
sition allowed the 11th Airborne Division to complete the American
encirclement of M anila on the night of the twelfth.

For the rest of the month the Americans and their Filipino allies
mopped up enemy resistance throughout the city. Due to the state of
J apanese communications, Yamashita did not learn of the efforts of his
subordinates in defending M anila until about 17 February, after it was
too late to countermand the order. The final weeks of fighting were
thus bloody, but the results were inevitable. On 4 M arch, with the cap-
ture of the giant Finance Building in the city center, Griswold reported
that enemy resistance had ceased. M anila was officially liberated. But
it was a city no more. Some observers commented that the destruction
was more complete than in Cologne, Hamburg, or even London.
A midst the devastation, M anila's residents tried to resume their lives.

j ust before the last fighting ended, M acA rthur summoned a provi-
sional assembly of prominent Filipinos to Malacanan Palace and in
their presence declared the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be
permanently reestablished. "My country kept the faith," he told the
gathered assembly. "Your capital city, cruelly punished though it be,
has regained its rightful place— citadel of democracy in the East."

Bataan and Corregidor

Securing M anila was significant for both military and psychologi-
cal reasons, but from a logistical point of view the seizure of Manila
Bay was especially crucial. The supply lines at Lingayen Bay, which
had so ably supported the A merican advance south on the capital, were
strained almost to the breaking point. Yet, despite the fact that
Manila's world-class harbor was in American hands, it could not be
used unless the Bataan Peninsula, which encompassed the bay's west-
ern shore, was secure.

Even as XIV Corps forces drove on Manila, MacA rthur had thus
ordered Krueger's Sixth Army to seize Bataan, including Corregidor,
the small island fortress at its southern tip. Since Griswold's troops
were fully occupied, M acA rthur supplemented Sixth Army with the XI
Corps from Leyte, commanded by M aj. Gen. Charles P. Hall. With the
38th Infantry Division and the 24th Division's 34th Infantry, the XI
Corps was to land on the Zambales coast some twenty-five miles
northwest of Bataan and drive rapidly east across the base of the
peninsula, and then sweep south, clearing the entire peninsula includ-
ing its eastern coast.

18

Prior to the assault, American intelligence had badly overestimat-
ed enemy strength, predicting that the J apanese had nearly 13,000 sol-
diers on Bataan. However, having decided that the defense of Manila
Bay was also beyond the capabilities of his forces, General Yamashita
had the Kembu Group commander, Maj. Gen. Rikichi Tsukada, place
fewer than 4,000 of his troops on the peninsula. The main defensive
force was Nagayoshi Detachment, a regiment from the 10th Division
under Col. Nagayoshi Sanenobu.

On the morning of 29 January, nearly 35,000 U.S. troops landed
just northwest of the peninsula. Elements of the 38th Division imme-
diately dashed inland to take the San Marcelino airstrip, but found
that Filipino guerrillas under the command of Capt. Ramon
Magsaysay, later president of the Republic of the Philippines, had
secured the field three days earlier. Elsewhere, surprise was com-
plete. In fact, the only casualty on that first day was an American
enlisted man, who was gored by an ornery bull. The next day Subic
Bay and Olongapo were occupied.

The Japanese chose to make a stand in the rugged Zambales
mountains at the northern base of the peninsula, which Americans
dubbed the "ZigZag Pass." Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of supplies
and ammunition for a long battle, but his main defensive line was a
mere 2,000 yards long, leaving his position open to flanking maneu-
vers. On 31 January Hall's forces advanced east, seeking out both
Japanese flanks. But unfavorable terrain and determined resistance by
the Japanese made it difficult. During the next two weeks, elements of
the 38th Division struggled to open the ZigZag Pass, and by 8
February they had overrun the main Japanese positions, killing more
than 2,400 defenders. Colonel Nagayoshi and 300 of his men escaped
farther south and joined other defenders who held out until the middle
of February. But before then the vital shoreline of Manila Bay had
been secured.

A Ithough Corregidor lacked the importance to the J apanese defense
that it had held for the Americans in 1942, it merited a separate attack.
M acA rthur's plan involved a combined amphibious and airborne assault,
the most difficult of all modern military maneuvers. The airborne attack
was obviously risky. At just over five square miles, Corregidor made a
small target for a parachute drop. To make matters more difficult, the
paratroopers were required to land on a hill known as Topside, the domi-
nant terrain feature on the island. On the other hand' there was little
choice. From Topside the Japanese could dominate all possible amphibi-
ous landing sites. In addition, thej apanese would certainly not expect an
airborne landing on such an unlikely target.

19

The planners were correct in their assumptions. On the morning
of 16 February the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team floated
down on the surprised defenders while a battalion of the 34th
Infantry stormed ashore. During fierce fighting, thej apanese tried to
regroup, and at one point, on the morning of 16 February, they
threatened to drive a salient into the paratroopers' tenuous foothold
on Topside. Pvt. Lloyd G. McCarter charged a key enemy position
and destroyed a machine gun nest with hand grenades. For his brav-
ery, McCarter was awarded the Medal of Honor. FI is actions and
those of many other paratroopers and infantrymen during the nine
days that followed helped defeat the Japanese on Corregidor. The
island fell on 26 February, and, six days later, M acArthur returned to
the fortress he had been forced to leave in disgrace three years
before.

Shimbu Group

The battles for Manila, Bataan, and Corregidor were only the
beginning of the Luzon Campaign. Both Shobu Group, securing
northern Luzon, and the bulk of Shimbu Group, defending the south,
remained intact. With about 50,000 men at his disposal, the Shimbu
Group commander, General Yokoyama, had deployed some 30,000
of them immediately east and south of Manila, with the remainder
arrayed along the narrow Bicol Peninsula to the southwest. The main
Japanese defenses near the capital were built around the 8th and
105th Divisions, with the rest of the manpower drawn from a jumble
of other units and provisional organizations. East of Manila, their
positions were organized in considerable depth but lacked good lines
of supply and reinforcement. Shimbu Group's eastern defenses obvi-
ously presented the most immediate threat to A merican control of the
Manila area and would have to be dealt with first.

By mid-February Krueger's Sixth Army staff had begun planning
operations against those Shimbu G roup forces closest to Manila.
Although still concerned about Shobu Group troop concentrations in
northern Luzon, both Krueger and M acArthur agreed that the Manila
area, the potential logistical base for all American activities on Luzon,
still had first priority. Nevertheless, M acArthur made Krueger's task
more difficult in the coming weeks by continually detaching troop
units from Sixth Army control and sending them to the southern and
central Philippines, which had been bypassed earlier. These diversions
greatly impaired Krueger's ability to deal with both Shobu and Shimbu
Groups at the same time.

20

Men of the 122d Field Artillery Battalion, 33d Division, fire a
105-mm. howitzer against a Japanese pocket in the hills of
Luzon. (National Archives)

By 20 February Krueger had positioned the 6th and 43d Infantry
Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regimental
Combat Team for an offensive in the rolling hills east of Manila. In
addition, as soon as M anila was secured, he wanted the 11th A irborne
Division to clear the area south of the capital, assisted by the indepen-

21

dent 158th Infantry. He hoped that the first effort could begin immedi-
ately and that the second would start by the first week in M arch.

The main objective of XIV Corps' attack against Shimbu Group
was to gain control of the Manila water supply, most of which came
from dams along the Angat and Marikina Rivers some twenty miles
northeast of the city. Here the coastal plains gave way to rolling
mountains and plunging valleys carved by rivers flowing toward the
sea. But two crucial errors affected the operation before it even
began. First, the Americans did not realize that the Wawa Dam,
thought to be one of M anila's sources of water, had been abandoned
in 1938 in favor of the larger Ipo Dam in the Marikina Valley. The
Wawa Dam could have been bypassed, but Krueger did not realize
his error for almost two months. Second, intelligence badly underes-
timated Shimbu Group's strength, reckoning that there were fewer
than 20,000 Japanese troops east of Manila when, in reality, there
were about 30,000. Enemy defensive positions were strung out along
a thin line about thirty miles long running from Ipo Dam in the north
to the town of Antipolo in the south. The Japanese positions alone
were of little strategic value, but together they commanded all the
high ground east of M anila.

On the afternoon of 20 February the XIV Corps launched its
attack. Griswold assigned the 6th Division the task of capturing the
dams in the north and ordered the 2d Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division, to attack the southern half of the Japanese defenses and
secure the town of Antipolo. Both units traversed the broad M arikina
Valley unmolested but encountered fierce resistance as they moved
into the hills and mountains forming the valley's eastern wall. There
the J apanese had honeycombed the area with subterranean strongholds
and machine gun positions covering all avenues of approach. Despite
massive Allied air support, the cavalry advanced slowly, on some days
measuring progress in mere yards: Not until 4 March did the troops
reach Antipolo. But success was bittersweet. The brigade had lost
nearly 60 men killed and 315 wounded, among them the 1st Cavalry
Division commander, General Mudge.

To the north the 6th Infantry Division fared only slightly better. Its
initial objectives were Mount Pacawagan and Mount M ataba, two
strategic high points crucial to capturing the Wawa Dam. Both moun-
tains were defended by extensive Japanese artillery and infantry posi-
tions. By 4 M arch the infantry's southernmost elements had gained a
precarious foothold on the crest of M ount Pacawagan, but they could
go no farther. Just to the north the Japanese continued to deny the
Americans any gains in the M ount M ataba area. Not until 8 M arch did

22

the infantry regain its momentum, gouging the Japanese defenders
from their positions as they advanced.

From his vantage point in the mountains, General Yokoyama was
concerned by these advances that threatened to envelop both his
flanks. Unwilling to abandon his excellent defensive positions on
Mataba and Pacawagan, he decided instead to launch a counterattack
aimed at the advancing 6th Division. His plans and their subsequent
execution typified major Japanese tactical weaknesses throughout the
war. Yokoyama scheduled a series of complicated maneuvers that
required meticulous coordination in difficult terrain, necessitating
sophisticated communications thatShimbu Group lacked. In addition,
the Japanese artillery was neither strong enough nor suitably deployed
to provide proper support. Still, the counterattack began on 12 March
with three reserve battalions assaulting three widely dispersed posi-
tions along the American line. How Yokoyama expected these scat-
tered attacks to succeed is unclear, but to make matters worse, they ran
straight into another major offensive of the 6th Division. In fact, the
counterattacks were so weak that the A mericans had no idea they were
even under attack. The entire effort demonstrated only that Shimbu
G roup was incapable of effective offensive action and that the original
defensive strategy was the best course. But the Japanese were irretriev-
ably weakened by the failed counterattack, and to Yokoyama the ulti-
mate fate of Shimbu Group was a foregone conclusion. All he could
do now was trade lives for terrain and time.

For the next two days, 13-14 March, the Americans battered
through J apanese positions, bolstered in the south by a regiment of the
43d Division sent in as reserve for the 1st Cavalry Division. The 6th
Division successfully cleaned out the extreme northern j apanese posi-
tions, securing a strong foothold on M ount M ataba. The cost, however,
continued to be high. On the morning of 14 M arch a burst from a hid-
den J apanese machine gun position caught a group of officers bunched
together at a regimental forward command post, mortally wounding
the division commander, Maj. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, and one of the
regimental commanders. Still, the dual offensives had begun to cave in
the Japanese defensive line at both the northern and southern flanks,
killing an estimated 3,350 enemy troops. On the American side, the
XIV Corps lost almost 300 dead and over 1,000 wounded in less than
a month of fighting.

On 14 M arch General Hall's XI Corps took over responsibility for
operations against Shimbu Group. With the 38th and 43d Infantry
Divisions, Hall decided to continue XIV Corps' strategy, although he
intended to concentrate more heavily on destroying the Japanese left,

23

or southern, flank. On 15 M arch American forces resumed the attack,
and by the twenty-second, to avoid complete encirclement, the
Japanese had begun withdrawing to the northeast. But the Americans
followed up quickly, and by 27 March they had penetrated the hasty
Japanese defenses, completely destroying Shimbu Group's left flank.
On 17 May the 43d Division, aided by guerrilla forces and air strikes
that delivered the heaviest concentration of napalm ever used in the
Southwest Pacific, captured the Ipo Dam intact and restored Manila's
water supply. Wawa Dam was captured, also undamaged, on 28 May
against comparatively light resistance. Continued pressure forced the
Japanese to withdraw deep into the Sierra M adre mountains in eastern
Luzon where starvation, disease, and guerrilla attacks gradually deci-
mated their ranks during the remainder of the war.

Shimbu Group's southern positions along the Bicol Peninsula
fared no better. After the XI Corps had relieved the XIV Corps in mid-
M arch, the latter concentrated on rooting the J apanese out of southern
Luzon. On 15 March the 6th Division, with the 112th Regimental
Combat Team attached, passed to the control of the X I Corps, and the
37th D ivision was placed in the Sixth A rmy reserve and given the mis-
sion of patrolling M anila. The XIV Corps now included the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 11th Airborne Division with the 158th
Regimental Combat Team attached. The corps held a line stretching
from Laguna de Bay, a huge lake at the northern edge of the Bicol
Peninsula, to Batangas Bay on the southern coast. Between the bays
lay Lake Taal, a smaller body of water, and a crucial road junction at
the town of Santo Tomas. On 19 March the 1st Cavalry Division on
the northern edge of the line and the 11th Airborne Division on the
south edge began a double enveloping drive around J apanese positions
near Lake Taal. The purpose of the drive was to open the highway
between Santo Tomas and Batangas, a move that was successfully
completed by month's end. On 24 March the 158th Regimental
Combat Team was taken from the 11th Airborne Division and ordered
to prepare for an amphibious landing at Legaspi on the southeast coast
of the Bicol Peninsula.

By 19 April, the Americans had completed their encirclement and
driven all the way to Luzon's east coast. The 11th Airborne Division
cut all routes leading to the Bicol Peninsula, while the 1st Cavalry
Division turned north into the Santa Maria Valley in a move intended
to turn Shimbu Group's southeast flank and prevent the Japanese from
using any of the small coastal towns as concentration or evacuation
points. By 25 M ay, the cavalry, with substantial support from guerrilla
units, had seized Infanta, the largest town along the coast.

25

The XIV Corps was now free to proceed with the liberation of the
Bicol Peninsula. The campaign had actually begun on 1 April when
the 158th Regimental Combat Team carried out its amphibious assault
at Legaspi on the southeastern tip of Luzon. Resistance was light
because the J apanese had transferred most of thei r troops to the north-
ern Shimbu Group positions during January. Although the 158th
Regimental Combat Team encountered many prepared defenses, the
opposition consisted mainly of support troops and naval service
troops, together with a few remnants that had escaped from Leyte. The
Americans had little trouble handling this hodgepodge of Japanese
defenders, and on 2 May they linked up with the 1st Cavalry Division,
which had been advancing into the peninsula from the northwest. By
31 May, all of southern Luzon was cleared of major enemy units, and
on 15 June the XIV Corps was relieved of tactical responsibility in
southern Luzon and transferred north.

Shobu Group

Despite the hard fighting in Manila, the Bataan Peninsula, and
throughout southern L uzon, the main J apanese force was in the northern
part of the island. It was there that General Yamashita's Shobu Group
occupied a large region resembling an inverted triangle, with northern
Luzon's rugged geography as a shield. In the east rose the Sierra M adre
mountain range, to the west the impressive hills of the Cordillera
Central, and at the northern edge of the triangle, the Babuyan channel.
In the center lay the Cagayan Valley, Luzon's rice bowl and a key supply
area for the Japanese units. Yamashita had pieced together a defensive
force made up of the 19th Division, the 23d Division, and elements of
three others: the 103d and 10th Divisions and the 2d Tank Division. Its
main purpose was to harass the Americans rather than to defeat them.
Yamashita expected the main attack to come from the M anila area
where American forces were consolidating their gains, particularly
along the handful of roads winding north through Bambang and Baguio
and into the Cagayan Valley. And there was always the possibility of
amphibious landings along the northern coastline.

In February, as American troops gradually pushed the enemy out
of Manila, General Krueger alerted the I Corps for an offensive into
northern Luzon against Shobu Group. Originally, Krueger had planned
to use a total of six divisions to gradually push north through
Bambang, but MacArthur's emphasis on securing the entire Manila
area first made this impossible. Nevertheless, by the end of February,
General Swift, the I Corps commander, had begun probing the area

26

"Trading Rations for Souvenirs” by Sidney Simon. Lingayen,
Philippines, 1945. (Army Art Collection)

north of the original beachhead with the 33d Division, which had
replaced the battle-weary 43d Division and the 158th Regimental
Combat Team on 13 February. Although Swift's forces were outnum-
bered two-to-one by the Japanese, the relative passivity of their foes
encouraged the more aggressive A mericans.

In early March Swift ordered the 33d Division to push northeast
along Route 11, the easiest road into the mountains, toward the town of
Bambang. But the attackers quickly discovered that this avenue was
heavily defended and made little progress. M eanwhile, other elements of
the division operating along the coast directly north from the Lingayen
Gulf landing beaches found little resistance. After taking some small
towns farther up the coast and turning inland Maj. Gen. Percy W.
Clarkson, the division commander, decided to dash along Route 9 and
attack Baguio— the prewar summer capital of the Philippines and cur-
rently Yamashita's headquarters— from the northeast. To assist, Krueger
added the 37th Infantry Division to the attack and with the aid of air
strikes and guerrilla harassment, wore down the defenders until they
were on the verge of starvation. A small garrison made a last stand at

28

Irisan Gorge, where the road crossed the Irisan River some three miles
west of Baguio, but on 27 April the town fell to American troops.

Shobu Group had lost one of the three legs of its defensive trian-
gle, but the battle on northern Luzon was far from over. Until the end
of the war, Sixth Army forces continued to push Yamashita's men far-
ther into the mountains, taking heavy casualties in the process. The
32d Division, which had also seen heavy fighting on Leyte, was worn
down to almost nothing, but the defenders suffered even heavier battle
casualties as well as losses to starvation and disease. By the end of the
war, the Japanese were still holding out in the rugged Asin Valley of
the Sierra M adre in north-central Luzon, enduring the drenching sum-
mer monsoons. Nevertheless, General Yamashita and about 50,500 of
his men surrendered only after the close of hostilities on 15 August.

On 30 J une 1945 Krueger's Sixth Army was relieved by the Eighth
Army, whose task was to mop up scattered j apanese positions. By the
end of M arch, however, the Allies controlled all of Luzon that had any
strategic or economic significance.

Analysis

Technically, the battle for Luzon was still not over when J apan sur-
rendered on 15 A ugust 1945. On the northern part of the island Shobu
G roup remained the center of attention for the better part of three U.S.
Army divisions. Altogether, almost 115,000 Japanese remained at large
on Luzon and on some of the southern islands. For all practical purpos-
es, however, the battle for control of Luzon had been over since M arch.

MacArthur can be both lauded and criticized for the Luzon
Campaign. On the one hand he had swiftly recaptured M anila and all
areas deemed critical for further operations against the Japanese. On
the other hand the enemy was not totally subdued and the Japanese
troops still posed a serious threat even after several months of fighting.
But many other J apanese garrisons had been left behind along the road
to the Japanese heartland— just as in the European theater the Allied
commanders had virtually ignored many German garrisons remaining
along the French Atlantic coast and on the English Channel. After
June, only a limited number of forces were needed to keep Shobu
G roup on the defensive. M ore significantly, Shobu G roup, representing
the largest Japanese troop concentration on the islands, contributed lit-
tle to the defense of Luzon. In the end they appeared more concerned
with their own pointless survival as a force in being than in interfering
in any way with American designs. The Japanese decision to fight a

29

passive war of attrition set the tone for the entire campaign. Had
Yamashita conducted a more active defense, one that did not meekly
surrender the initiative to the A mericans, the struggle might have been
shorter but much sharper. In such a case, MacArthur's single-minded
drive on M anila might have been judged a risky venture and the diver-
sion of troops to liberate other minor islands a dangerous practice. And
had the A mericans suffered even minor reverses on the battlefield in the
early days of January and February, the struggle might also have been
prolonged until August at an even heavier cost in American lives.

Taken altogether, MacArthur's offensive had contained or taken
out of the war over 380,000 J apanese, rendering them unavailable for
the defense of the homeland. In the final analysis, the fall of Luzon
meant once and for all that the Japanese Empire was doomed. The bat-
tles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf had left its fleet in tatters,
and the ground campaigns that followed turned the once-proud
J apanese A rmy into a shadow of its former self.

Casualties on both sides were staggering. Except for those forces
surrendering at the end of the war, the Japanese lost virtually all of the
230,000 military personnel on Luzon, in addition to some 70,000
casualties from the previous battle on Leyte Island. By the summer of
1945, the A mericans had thus destroyed nine of j apan's best divisions
and made another six combat-ineffective. Losses stemming from the
battle so drastically reduced Japanese air power that the use of
kamikaze operations was necessary throughout the rest of the war.

A merican casualties were also high. G round combat losses for the
Sixth and Eighth Armies were almost 47,000, some 10,380 killed and
36,550 wounded. Nonbattle casualties were even heavier. From 9
J anuary through 30 J une 1945, the Sixth A rmy on L uzon suffered over
93,400 noncombat casualties, including 260 deaths, most of them
from disease. Only a few campaigns had a higher casualty rate.

For the first time during the Pacific war, American troops were
deployed in field army strength, making for a sometimes unwieldy com-
mand structure. In earlier campaigns throughout the Pacific, the U.S.
theater commanders had generally employed one or two divisions at a
time to seize small islands or small portions of coastline. In contrast, the
Luzon Campaign saw extended operations inland which demanded the
deployment of multicorps forces supported by greatly expanded logisti-
cal and communications systems. Fortunately for the Americans, all but
one of the participating U.S. divisions had had previous experience in
fighting thej apanese, particularly on Leyte only a few months before. In
fact, except for the urban fighting in M anila, American units were in the
enviable position of applying past lessons to the battlefield. The

30

A mericans also had the advantage of superior weapons, equipment, and
supplies and by January, control of both the local seas and air. Finally,
the flat open plains of central L uzon were conducive to the A mericans'
advantage in maneuverability and firepower. During earlier battles on
the Pacific's small jungle islands, the terrain often worked to the
Japanese advantage; on Luzon, the reverse was so. But again, due to the
scope of the battlefield, it was the A merican ability to perform effective-
ly at the larger, operational level of war that was tested for the first time
in the Pacific during the Luzon Campaign.

Although the reconquest of Luzon was a severe blow to the
Japanese and placed the Allies one step closer to total victory, Japan
would not admit defeat. An invasion of the Japanese homeland still
loomed large in American planning and expectations. But the battle
for Luzon had steeled America's fighting men for the daunting task
ahead. Their victory was not merely another stepping stone in
MacArthur's island-hopping campaign. It marked the first time that the
Japanese were driven from a strategic area that they had captured at
the beginning of the war. And if American soldiers needed any other
impetus, many of them received it when they saw the horror of
Japanese prison camps. To many, it made the difficult battle of
Luzon— and the specter of a possible invasion of the Japanese main-
land— seem worthwhile.

31

Further Readings

The most complete works on the Luzon Campaign are the official
volumes produced by the Army and Navy, particularly Robert Ross
Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (1963), and Samuel Eliot M orison,
The Liberation of the Philippines (1963). The best account contained
in a general work on the Pacific war is Ronald Spector, Eagle Against
the Sun (1985). Other significant general studies include J ohn Toland,
The Rising Sun (1970), and James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of
World War II (1980). Various M acArthur biographies, such as M ichael
Schaller, Douglas M acArthur: Far Eastern General (1989), cover
MacArthur's personal involvement in the campaign, but with the
exception of D. Clayton J ames' excellent The Years of M acArthur:
Volume II, 1941-1945 (1970), go into few operational details.

CM H Pub 72-28

Cover: Troops on H ill 604 fire on J apanese positions.
(National Archives)

PIN : 072924-000